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ABSTRACT
 
The U.S. Congress and executive have battled since the
 
presidency of George Washington over which branch of
 
government should initiate military actions. While Congress
 
is granted.the pow?er to declare war, the executive is
 
vested with powers that are not as exhaustively listed as
 
those of the legisilative and the judiciary. This has
 
allowed the execut;ive to assume presidential prerogatives
 
that appear to some to be unlimited, causing Congress to
 
react with legislation designed to counter presidential
 
power.
 
The conflicts between Congress and the executive are
 
the result of an ambiguity in executive power that the
 
framers of the Constitution found impossible to resolve,
 
Without presuming to draw definitive conclusions on the
 
issue, this thesis will examine the conflicting notions of
 
executive power anil how they apply to various "presidential
 
wars" that were conducted without prior congressional
 
approval.
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Chapter 1:
 
Thesis Overview
 
A definitive theory of executive power on which both
 
Congress and the executive concur has proven elusive. While
 
the Constitutioh attempts to delineate the separation of
 
powers between the legislative, judicial and executive
 
branches of goverhment, debates over original intent (i.e.,
 
what the framers of the Constitution intended) and
 
presidential prerogative (i.e., presidential power beyorid
 
that which is clearly granted by the Constitution) began
 
before the Cohstitution was ratified and continues to this
 
Many scholars have noted the ambiguity of executive
 
power and the problems that have developed from it. This
 
ambiguity has resulted ip incessant conflicts between
 
Congress and the executive, especially on issues related to
 
war powers. Congress professes to promote a strict
 
adherence to the Constitution because it grants it the
 
power to declare war — though Congress has often used the
 
ambiguity of executive power to shield itself from
 
criticism. Presidents focus on the notion of prerogative.
 
which they can use to assume powers beyond those strictly
 
granted to the executive by the Constitution.
 
To complicate matters, there are other reasons why
 
political battles have waged since the presidency of George
 
Washington between Congress and the executive over the
 
scope of their respective war powers. Though the
 
Constitution clearly states that Congress has the power to
 
declare war, and the executive the charge to make (i.e.,
 
"conduct") war, ^ there are scholars who cite problems of
 
diction and consider the wording of the Constitution too
 
equivocal. However, James Madison (the chief drafter of the
 
Constitution) did not seem to intend any such ambiguity
 
when he stated that "Those who conduct war cannot in the
 
nature of things, be proper or safe judges, whether a war
 
ought to be commenced, continued, or concluded."
 
In the context of delineating Constitutional war
 
powers, we will discuss how the issues of executive power,
 
diction, necessity and pragmatism have affected how the
 
principles embodied in the Constitution are applied, and
 
how the application of the principles can change over time
 
and be influenced by specific time periods.
 
In addition to focussing on war powers, we will
 
discuss the related issue of congressional influence on
 
foreign affairs, and what sortie scholars consider an
 
increasing imbalance of power in favor of the executive
 
that has diminished significantly the ability of Congress
 
to guide foreign policy.
 
As we evaluate actions of Congress and the executive,
 
we will employ approaches intended to be objective, yet
 
critical. Original intent of the Constitution must be
 
considered, as well as the many and complex views of
 
executive power. However, what we may find most
 
illuminating in judging presidential actions related to war
 
powers is circumstance. This should not be surprising if
 
one considers the work of Thucydides, the Greek considered
 
the father of political realism. His histories of the
 
Pelopponesian Wars demonstrate how wars both require
 
different — and often drastic — measures from leaders,
 
while bringing to the fore man's natural instinct to eschew
 
justice in times of necessity. ^ This will be discussed
 
later in relation to the actions - which some scholars
 
consider unconstitutional — of President Abraham Lincoln
 
during the Civil War.
 
Though this thesis ultimately promotes the belief that
 
presidents too often have abused the concept of prerogative
 
to conduct military actions that were not sanctioned by
 
Congress, it does not attempt to draw firm conclusions
 
regarding a fixed concept of the nature of executive power
 
or to delineate definitively the appropriate circumstances
 
in which only Congress can sanction the use of U.S. troops.
 
Due to the complexities of the issues involved, we may find
 
our discussion more illuminating if we evaluate
 
presidential actions by asking the following questions:
 
• What are the constitutional guidelines?: While we
 
should be prepared to entertain a flexible
 
interpretation of the Constitution in some
 
instances, we should also be aware of its set
 
principles before evaluating presidential
 
actions.
 
• What actions were taken?; There is an obvious
 
difference between a president sending troops
 
abroad for peace-keeping missions — even into
 
areas that may have active military action — than
 
a president using troops to attack another
 
country without provocation or congressional
 
approval.
 
• What were the overall and partiGular circumstances
 
in which the actions were taken?; We will discuss
 
latei: in great detail the importance of
 
"situation" in the evaluation of presidential
 
actions and understahd how measures taken by
 
Lincoln during an insurrection were different
 
from Folk's actions in the Mexican War or Lyndon
 
Johnson's during the Vietnam War.
 
• What were the outcomes?: This is a question based on
 
both the currently popular notion of "equality of
 
result" ^  — and on Machiavelli's well-known "ends
 
justifying the means." Should we judge presidents
 
whose actions were less successful more harshly
 
than those who triumphed? Do we allow more
 
ektreme action for those that succeed than for
 
those that fail, even under the same conditions?
 
• How might the actions be interpreted by the Supreme
 
Court?; History shows that the Suprenie Court has
 
never upheld a presidential claim of war power
 
against that of Congress and that only one lower
 
court ever decided against Congress ^ The Court
 
often considers original intent — which seems to
 
favor a strict interpretation of the Constitution
 
and limited executive war power — and has used
 
The Federalist Papers in its adjudications.
 
What is the character of the president in question?:
 
Is there consensus that the president truly acted
 
in the interests of the common good, or is he
 
abusing executive prerogative for individual,
 
selfish motives? The former might be best
 
exemplified by Jefferson taking actions beyond
 
powers vested in the executive to complete the
 
Louisiana Purchase,^ and the latter
 
exemplified by Nixon's actions during the
 
Watergate investigations. ^
 
What are the prevailing concepts of executive power
 
in relation to the limits of the president?: This
 
is a highly theoretical question that seems
 
rarely voiced in congressional debate, yet it
 
lies at the crux of the matter. Congress
 
favors a strict, literal interpretation of the
 
Constitution, so its arguments for reasserting
 
its power to declare war and to be involved more
 
in foreign affairs can seem superficial. Congress
 
does not sufficiently argue its points by
 
discussing the notions of executive power,
 
original intent, how perceptions of it change
 
over the years — or in different situations — nor
 
why many constitutional scholars confidently make
 
the case for presidential prerogative.
 
How did the Cold War affect the need for
 
presidential prerogative and how does the post-

Cold War era necessitate the need for a different
 
approach to foreign affairs?
 
Using the aboye measures, this thesis will begin by
 
reviewing the mandates of the Constitution and what is
 
considered "Original intent." Next, we will review key
 
theories of executive power before examining several cases
 
of extraordinary — and sometimes clearly unconstitutional ­
presidential military actions. This will lead us to a
 
description of the 1973 War Powers Act, an attempt by
 
Congress to reassert its own constitutional prerogatives
 
and wield more power in foreign affairs, especially when
 
U.S. troops are deployed abroad.
 
Though this thesis promises no definitive answers on
 
how to resolve contested use of presidential prerogative,
 
it will provide an overview of the issues that should be
 
considered before evaluating presidential actions, and
 
conclude with a discussion on the limits of presidential
 
Chapter IZ:
 
Perspectives on the Constitution and Original Intent
 
IVe can see that more is at stake even than the constitutional
 
principle of the separation of powers. At stake is the age-long effort
 
of men to fix effective limits on government; at stake is the
 
reconciliation of the claims of freedom and of security; at stake the
 
fateful issue of peace or war, and issue fateful not for the American
 
people alone, not alone for the stricken peoples of Southeast Asia, but
 
for the whole of mankind.
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Henry Steel Coinmager
 
One cannot discuss the appropriate assignment of war
 
powers in the United States without first studying the
 
Constitution and considering the original intent of its
 
framers. Article I, Section eight of the Constitution
 
clearly places the power to declare war in Congress (see
 
Appendix A). Nowhere is that power granted to the
 
executive. Article II, Section two provides three major
 
areas of presidential power: administration, legislation,
 
and foreign affairs. It designates the executive as the
 
Commander-in-Chief and grants that branch of government the
 
power — "by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate"
 
— to make treaties (Appendix B).
 
On a superficial basis, the intent of the Founding
 
Fathers seems indisputable. They had followed the advice of
 
the French writer and jurist Montesquieu, who held that
 
governmental powers should be separated and balanced to
 
guarantee individual rights and freedom. Madison believed
 
that constitutional liberties could be preserved only by
 
reserving the power of war to Congress. In The Federalist
 
47, he stated that "The accumulations of all powers,
 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands
 
... may justly be pronounced the very definition of
 
In addition to Montesquieu, the Founding Fathers drew
 
from the writings of Polybius, a Greek historian who had
 
lived in Rome. He had studied that empire's system of
 
government and wrote a forty-volume Universal History to
 
show how and why all the civilized countries of the world
 
had fallen under the dominion of Rome. He — like Aristotle
 
before him and Montesquieu much later — concluded that the
 
most successful form of government was one that provided
 
for a separation of powers.
 
Thomas Jefferson was also a defender of a government
 
that granted Congress the power to declare war. While
 
Secretary of State, he made the following statement:
 
Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to
 
decide between war, tribute, and ransom, as the
 
means of re-establishing our Mediterranean
 
commerce. If war, they will consider how far our
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resources shall be called forth, and how far they
 
will enable the Executive to engage, in the forms
 
of the constitution, the cooperation of other
 
powers.
 
Even Alexander Hamilton - known for his support of a
 
strong executive branch to achieve "executive energy" and
 
avoid "legislative usurption" of presidential prerogative —
 
differentiated between the power of a president and that of
 
a monarch. In The Federalist 69, Hamilton stated that
 
"There is no comparison between the intended power of the
 
President and the actual power of the British sovereign." 
 
Agreeing with Hamilton, in 1999 Texas Congressman Ron
 
Paul expressed his concern about the increase of
 
"presidential wars" in the 20''^ century by noting that
 
"While kings may have the right to promulgate laws simply
 
be decree, it is Rule of Law which is king in our form of
 
government." Another, congressman. Jack Metcalf, concurs,
 
stating that "Congress has ceded to the executive Branch,
 
its fundamental Constitutional duty," and that in decisions
 
to declare war, "the framers expected national policy to be
 
the result of open and full debate.""
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Though both Hamilton and Madison were considered the
 
two who best understood the importance of the allocation of
 
war powers, it was Madison alone who focussed on this
 
section of the Constitution because he "foresaw the twin
 
problems of fear and violence giving strength to the
 
Executive."
 
John Hart Ely cites the following reasons why the
 
Founding Fathers vested the power to declare war with the
 
legislative:
 
• A determination not to let such decisions be taken
 
easily
 
• The inclusion of the House of Representatives into
 
the decision - despite their lack of expertise on
 
foreign affairs — to slow down the process, to assure
 
a "sober second thought"
 
• The inclusion of the House of Representatives into
 
the decision since it is viewed as "the people's
 
house" and would increase the participation of the
 
people
 
Ely also noted that James Madison considered war to be
 
"among the greatest of national calamities" and so sought
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to design the Constitution to assure the expectation of
 
peace. In addition, Madison stated the following:
 
The Constitution supposes, what the History
 
of all Governments demonstrates, that the
 
Executive is the branch of power most interested
 
in war, and most prone to it. It has accordingly
 
with studied care, vested the guestion of war in
 
the Legislative. 17
 
Peter Raven-Hansen's has delineated the following six
 
major conclusions from the War Clause of the Constitution:
 
1. The framers intended it to be harder to initiate
 
war than to achieve or continue peace
 
2. Congress' power to "declare" war was not merely
 
ceremonial, but rather the power to commence war
 
when it had not already been commenced against us
 
by an enemy
 
3. The president has clear power to repel sudden attacks
 
4. The president has sole power as Commander-in-Chief
 
to conduct all wars
 
5. Congress' appropriation power with respect to the
 
military was designed to keep "the means of
 
carrying on the war" in the legislative, not the
 
executive branch
 
6. Congress' power to grant letters of marque and
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reprisal applies in the same manner to uses of
 
force less than war"
 
W. Taylor Reveley sheds light on the cause of the
 
debate by listing the following four main influences on the
 
division of authority oyer war and peace between the
 
president and Congress:
 
1. The text of the Constitution's war-power provisions
 
2. The purposes of those who wrote and ratified the
 
text in 1787-88
 
3. Evolving beliefs since 1789 about what the
 
Constitution requires, and — irrespective of text,
 
purposes, and evolving beliefs
 
4. Various allocations of control over the war powers
 
that have existed in fact between the President and
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Congress during the past two centuries
 
We have already discussed the text of the Constitution
 
(Reveley's point #1) and original intent (#2). What Reveley
 
also noted is that time can change how the text of the
 
Constitution is interpreted. In addition, the de facto
 
allocation of war powers has not always followed the letter
 
14
 
of the law. (How else do we find that only six of the 20Q
 
armed conflicts in Vi^hich the U.S. has been involved were
 
■ 20" 
formally declared wars by Congress?)
 
Reveley's points are important because they
 
acknowledge both the de jure and de facto nature of the
 
military actions that have been taken and contribute to a
 
more sophisticated analysis of a complex problem. But were
 
the issues involved in the debate over Constitutional war
 
powers simple, they would not remain unresolved to the
 
So after over 200 years of constitutional analysis,
 
some scholars categorically assert that the poWer to
 
declare war is vested only in Congress, while others
 
support the idea of wide executive prerogative, which was
 
so eloquently and convincingly proposed by Locke that it is
 
easy to understand why the idea was so prominent in the
 
minds of the framers of the Constitution, despite the
 
determination to form a government that would never be
 
subject to a monarch.
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Chapter III:
 
Theories of the Nature of Executive Power
 
The first constitutional challencre;
 
I never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the
 
Executive alone to declare war.
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Elbridge Gerry
 
Not long after being ratified in 1789, the
 
Constitution was subject to heated debate regarding the
 
designation of war powers between Congress and the
 
executive. The debate began in 1793 when President George
 
Washington issued a Neutrality Proclamation intended to
 
keep the United States Out of the series of conflicts and
 
. . 22
 
wars raging in Europe between France and Great Britain.
 
Analysis of the proclamation showed the strong bias of
 
the Federalist Party (which included the president,
 
Alexander Hamilton and John Jay) in favor of Great Britain.
 
The Republican Party (which included Thomas Jefferson
 
and Madison) considered the proclamation unfair to France,
 
which had supported the American colonists in their
 
revolution of independence from Great Britain. As Jacob
 
■ . 16 
Javits notes, "no dilernma Gonfronting the President
 
reflected the faction in his cabinet with more clarity than
 
the battle regarding neutrality."
 
The debate about Washington's Neutrality Act was
 
conducted partly in print when Madison — urged by Jefferson
 
— used the nom de plume "Helvidius" to publish a series of
 
letters in opposition to Hamilton (who wrote under the name
 
"Pacificus"). Ruth Weissbourd Grant and Stephen Grant
 
summarized Madison's arguments by stating the following,
 
which demonstrates Madison's strict interpretation of the
 
Constitution:
 
Madison argues further that the executive
 
interpretation of treaties cannot in any case
 
include a right to judge whether or not the
 
nation is obliged to go to war under a treaty.
 
Such a right is inseparable from the power to
 
declare war, and as such is a usurpation of power
 
given to the legislature and a violation of
 
separation of powers.
 
Madison's points may be substantiated if we examine
 
the various neutrality acts that have been passed in the
 
United States. When we do, we find that it is Congress that
 
usually initiates such proclamations. It was Congress that
 
passed a neutrality act in 1794 to curb private activities
 
17
 
in foreign inilitarY actions and Congress that passed the
 
Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937, "many of them
 
warned about increasing the power of the president in
 
27
 
foreign affairs beyond congressional reach."
 
With his Neutrality Proclamation, Washington ­
operating under the advice of Hamilton — announced that it
 
was the "duty and interest" and the "disposition" of the
 
country to be impartial in the war which had broken out in
 
Europe between France and Great Britain. Washington warned
 
Americans not to "contravene such disposition" because he
 
believed that the United States "was not obligated under
 
its 1778 treaty with France to enter the war on the side of
 
that nation."
 
If we use the measure of character — as mentioned in
 
chapter one, we would see in Washington a great leader who
 
exemplified much of what was best about the United States.
 
Many — in his time and now - believed that he "symbolized
 
qualities of discipline, aristocratic duty, military
 
orthodoxy, and persistence in adversity that his
 
contemporaries particularly valued as marks of mature
 
political leadership." In light of this, it may seem
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inappropriate for anyone to question Washington's motives
 
and methods.
 
Yet the debate between Hamilton and Madison over the
 
proclamation was more a test of the new constitution's
 
policies than an attack on Washington's character. Madison
 
conceded that a similar proclamation might be justified,
 
but on narrower grounds. Hamilton cited the "vesting
 
blanse":bf Article^;!^^ he and others - primarily
 
Federalists who favored a strong executive — interpreted as
 
giving the executive wide powers.
 
According to Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson,
 
Gouverneur Morris (chief draftsman of the Constitution's
 
Committee of Style) deliberately left the wording of the
 
vesting clause for the executive vague. The clause states
 
that "the executive power shall be vested in a President of
 
the United States of America," leaving an opportunity for
 
many constitutional scholars to note that no exhaustive
 
list of executive powers is delineated. However, Morris
 
worded the vesting clause for Congress to read that "All
 
legislative powers herein granted [emphasis added] shall be
 
vested in a Congress of the United States".
 
The latter clause implies that only the powers
 
specifically listed in the Constitution belong to Congress.
 
 iMcSer this stiict interpretatioh/ GQngresS cannot ciai^vt
 
saine coiiceht Of Locke'h;*pfarpgat^ :as can tha executive.
 
Locke explains "prerogative" below;
 
For the legislators not being able ^ :
 
foresee and provide by laws for all that may be
 
useful to the community, the executor of the laws
 
[the "executive"], having the power in his hands,
 
has by the common law of Nature a right to make
 
use of it to for the good of society, in many
 
cases where the municipal law has given no
 
"V direction.
 
■ The above quotation refers to the difference between 
"natural law" and "positive law." Natural law is "a body of 
law or a specific principle held to be derived from nature 
and binding upon human society in the absence of or in 
addition to positive law," while positive law is 
"established or recognized by governmental authority."
 
Michael Glennon notes how the Roman empire "promulgated a
 
law of nations that has been interpreted as little
 
different from natural law in its emphasis on universal
 
principles of justice and equality." One can see how
 
Locke used the idea of natural law — as opposed to
 
specifically prescribed law — as the idea behind
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presidential prerogative, which would support Washington's
 
purview to declare a "state of neutrality."
 
The debate over Washington's Neutrality Proclamation
 
ended with an apparent victory for Hamilton and those who
 
favored a strong executive. Occurring in the first
 
presidency, this conflict signaled what would be an on
 
going battle between Congress and the executive over war
 
powers, and demonstrated that the framers of the
 
Constitution had not been able to reach consensus over the
 
nature of the executive.
 
In defense of democracy:
 
The necessary exactions of any government bring more danger and
 
dishonor to free governments than to tyrannies,
 
34
 
Harvey Mansfield
 
Often inherent in the beliefs of those who favor a
 
strong executive is the view that democracy cannot be
 
defended by weak governments, or by presidents on whom too
 
many limitations of power have been imposed. Thomas Carlyle
 
expressed concern about strong governments by asking, "If
 
the government is big enough to give you everything you
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 35 
wantj is it big enough to take away everything you have?"
 
In his special message to Congress on July 4, 1861,
 
President Abraham Lincoln paraphrased Carlyle by asking,
 
"Must a Government, of necessity, be too strong for the
 
liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its
 
own existence?"
 
Harvey Mansfield sympathizes with Lincoln. Mansfield
 
notes that free republics often "come to grief or fade into
 
memories of glory," and cites the examples of Venice and
 
many German cities, as well as free republics that
 
"blossomed large and grew small fruit" (e.g., the Dutch
 
republics), or republics that "remained locked in a
 
mountain retreat" (e.g., the Swiss cantons). However,
 
Mansfield also notes that the tyrannical excesses of
 
"republics" —such as Cromwell's Commonwealth in England
 
after the deposing and beheading of Charles I — "left
 
republicanism with a heavy burden of popular disgust and
 
. . 38
 
learned disdaxn."
 
As we try to determine when presidential actions
 
exceed their authority, we should ask ourselves how far we
 
want our government to go in defending what many consider
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 the best form of government (i.e., a representative
 
democracy, as in the United States).
 
Some political theorists believe that since no mere
 
document — including the Constitution — can stop real
 
tyranny, the executive must be strong. Such theorists
 
extol the decisive — and successful — actions taken by
 
Lincoln during the Civil War and note that the U.S. has
 
been fortunate to have had strong executives during its
 
most prominent wars (e.g., James Polk during the Mexican ,
 
War, Woodrow Wilson in World War I, and Franklin Delano
 
Roosevelt in World War II).
 
- Despite the reasons stated above for a strong
 
executive, those who wish a government free of tyranny
 
concern themselves with trying to curtail excesses of
 
power. Though it may be too naive to believe — as pessimist
 
Arthur Schopenhauer did — that "ethical goals cannot be
 
achieved by unethical means," Glennon states that
 
"governmental deceit is saddening because it bespeaks a
 
distrust of the insight and good sense of the people."
 
To those in favor of a strong executive, Glennon's
 
statement is fraught with misconceptions. First,
 
"governmental deceit" is sometimes warranted. While it can
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 be pointed out that this is especially true during,times of
 
war, it can additionally be said that in today's world of
 
continual global conflict* covert actions while often
 
unsavory — are unavoidable. However, we then are left with
 
the fact that some covert actions - which are directed by
 
the executive through the CIA and National Security Council
 
— have been conducted contrary to congressional will and
 
.ic sentiment (e.g., Reagan's funding of the Contras in
 
Nicaragua despite the Boland Amendments).
 
Second, Glennon's belief in "the insight and good
 
sense of the people" leads to understandable debate. The
 
constitutional democracy of the United States is structured
 
to avoid a tyranny of the masses — the majority of whom are
 
not as well-educated or informed as their elected
 
representatives, an arguably not as "virtuous" as the
 
framers of the Constitution. The specter of ochlocracy
 
(i.e., mob rule) is abated by the Constitution and the Bill
 
of Rights that work in tandem to provide a wide degree of
 
individual freedom, yet within a constitutional framework
 
that provides for a representative form of government.
 
Thus, we achieve as much as possible Aristotle's ideal of a
 
government led by "aristocrats" (i.e., those with the moral
 
and intellectual ability to represent others best).
 
. . 24 
 i
 
We end the question of how best to defend a democracy
 
without employing too many undemocratic actions with a
 
quotation from Glennon, who states that while diplomacy can
 
clash with constitutionalism, the "interests of diplomacy
 
cannot be pursued by discarding the interests of
 
constitutionalism." To Glennon, democracy can ^  and
 
should ^  be defended with actions that not only support,
 
but are consonant with the ideals of democracy.
 
Situational analysis of presidential prerogative:
 
The state's annihilation are of the highest importance in the moral
 
calculus, and that acting to prevent the state's destruction may take
 
precedence over competing mora.1 cleims,
 
44
 
Michael Walzer
 
In reviewing presidential actions, we sometimes fail
 
to consider the concept of prudence as dealing with unique
 
situations that cannot be anticipated. Such situations
 
cannot be legislated easily in advance and demonstrate the
 
limitations of any constitutipn, especially one drafted by
 
leaders (e.g., Madison) who believed that the United States
 
usually would be at peace. As John Hart Ely notes, it is
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"triiiy ithpossibl to predict arid Specify all the pdssibie
 
situations in which the president will need to act to
 
protect the nation's security before he has time to obtain
 
congressional authorization."
 
The following quotation by Locke describes how his
 
concept of prerogative was designed to recognize the
 
special times when the normal legislative process could not
 
be followed without seriously jeopardizing the state:
 
: This power to act according to discretion
 
for the public good, without the prescription of
 
the law and sometimes even against it> is that
 
which is called prerogative; for since in some
 
governments the law-making power is not always in
 
■; 	being and is usually too numerous, and so too 
slow for the dispatch requisite to execution, and 
because, also, it is impossible to foresee and so 
by laws to provide for all accidents and 
necessities that may concern the public [emphasis 
added] . . . therefore there is a latitude left 
to the executive power to do many things of 
choice which the laws do not prescribe. 
One of the many mistakes made by the 1973 War Powers 
Act was trying to delineate when presidents could and could 
not initiate military actions without congressional 
approval. The framers of the act seemed to overlook the 
fact that certain situations allowed limited presidential 
action. Though not listed in the War Powers Act, presidents 
■ .i: 	 "■ /26: ■ 
have the constitutional right to use the military to rescue
 
U.S. citizens abroad, rescue foreign nationals when it
 
directly affects the rescue of its own citizens, protect
 
embassies, implement cease-fires involving the U.S., and to
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carry out the security commitments in a treaty.
 
Yet despite the logic of the arguments detailed above,
 
there have been times when both Congress and the public
 
have questioned presidential actions. Challenging the
 
application of the domino theory and containment, many
 
Americans protested against the Vietnam War with
 
unparalleled violent dissent, journalist Walter Lippmann
 
called containment a "strategic monstrosity" because it did
 
not adequately differentiate "vital from peripheral areas,"
 
and had the potential of causing many unnecessary military
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conflicts in non-strategic places around the globe.
 
While Michael Glennon notes that "presidential
 
authority exists in emergency situations of bona fide
 
threats to the survival of the nation," he also notes
 
that "crises have been the cause of constitutional
 
imbalance." Part of the conflict between Congress and
 
the executive relates to how those two branches of
 
government define a crisis and that it is Congress that
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usually depends on a strict application of the
 
Constitution, which it tries to use to gain more
 
involvement in military actions and foreign affairs.
 
Yet there are times when the situation demands quick,
 
decisive, action that logistically only can be achieved by
 
the executive. No case better exemplifies this than that of
 
President Lincoln and the actions he took during the Civil
 
War. Though Lincoln's actions have been labeled
 
unconstitutional by some scholars, others defend his
 
actions because they occurred under the unique
 
circumstances of an insurrection. Robert Tucker notes the
 
following:
 
The state "has been found almost everywhere
 
to be, if not the source of values, then at least
 
the indispensable condition of values . . . This
 
serves to justify the extreme measures which may
 
be taken to preserve it."
 
Yet, according to Jacob Javits, Lincoln "assumed a
 
series of powers relating to the conduct of the war and of
 
the national life that were constitutionally unwarranted"
 
and "Lincoln's assumption of war powers was on so huge a
 
scale as to change historically the nature of the
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QOnstitutional These actions included the
 
following:
 
• Calling the "emergency Congress" three months after
 
most of the drastic actions he took at the
 
outbreak of the Civil War in 1861
 
• Appropriating funds for the military without
 
required laws passed to do so.
 
the writ of habeas corpus (a power
 
specifically granted in the Constitution to
 
Congress)
 
• Ordering summary arrests (i.e., without warrant)
 
• Barring from the mails any materials he deemed
 
inimical to the national interest
 
• Confiscating personal property
 
• Applying a system of martial law to persons
 
instead of to areas
 
Alexander Bickel, however, defends Lincoln's actions
 
by noting the importance that circumstance plays in
 
relation to presidential actions. Bickel states that
 
"Lincoln's actions in the singular circumstances of the
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outbreak of civil war were not only great and good, but
 
different in legal contemplation from the international use
 
of force. Bickel — like many constitutional scbolars —
 
differentiates between military actions during an
 
insurrection and those during wan with a foreign country.
 
And despite the fact that the special constitutional powers
 
granted for repelling insurrections were given to Congress,
 
not the executive, Corwin recalls Locke's notion of
 
presidential prerogative by noting that "in meeting the
 
domestic problems that a great war inevitably throws up, an
 
indefinite [emphasis added] power must be attributed to the
 
president." 57
 
In the special session of Congress on July 4, 1861,
 
Lincoln reviewed the initial stages of the Civil War and
 
explained the extraordinary actions he had taken in the
 
months prior to this congressional session. Lincoln noted
 
that the "Founding Fathers did not think in every case that
 
58 ■ ■ danger should run its course until Congress convened,"
 
though he did not explain why he waited three months to
 
convene Congress. While some support his actions by
 
reminding us of the limited transportation and
 
communication of that era (i.e., no e-mails or bullet
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trains), others speculate that Lincoln wanted that time
 
to assume dictatorial powers which he considered necessary
 
to act quickly against the insurrection.
 
Sounding a bit Machiavellian, near the end of that
 
message of July 4, 1861, Lincoln also noted that "when an
 
end is lawful and obligatory/ the indispensable means to it
 
are also lawful and obligatory." But the differences
 
between Machiavelli and Lincoln are obvious. Machiavelli
 
believed that "princes" should employ all and any means
 
necessary to retain power. In contrast, Lincoln did only
 
"what he deemed his duty" to preserve the Union. His
 
actions adhered to Locke's concept of prerogative because
 
they were enacted "according to the public good" and with
 
the idea that all the actions were those that Congress
 
would have made." (This was substantiated when Congress
 
upheld Lincoln's early war actions.)
 
Those who disagree with Locke's notion of prerogative
 
may have supported Lincoln's actions during a civil war,
 
but would have labeled them clearly unconstitutional had
 
they been taken during a war with a foreign nation. Such
 
scholars would note the limitations of prerogative as we
 
will debate in depth at the end of this thesis. However,
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those who believe that we should only focus on the "ends" —
 
regardless of the "means" — would concur with Machiavelli's
 
infamous quotation noted above.
 
We conclude this discussion of circumstance and
 
Lincoln's actions during the Civil War with the following
 
quotation by Sidney Milkis and Michael Nelson:
 
While Lincoln's grasping of the reins of
 
power caused him to be denounced as a dictator,
 
other aspects of his leadership demonstrated more
 
obviously his faithfulness to the purpose for
 
which the Union and the Constitution had been
 
ordained. Thus, the Constitution, although
 
stretched severely, was not subverted during the
 
Civil War.
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Iioss of Congressional Power in Foreign Affairs
 
"The war-making power of the president constantly erodes the war-

declaring power of Congress,"
 
Louis Fisher
 
According to Alexander Bickel, the erosion of
 
congressional power has been slow, but steady, and many
 
presidential exploits "have denuded the Congress of its
 
portion of the war powers and have ended by establishing
 
the imperial President." Since wars generally require
 
swift action that American presidents have rarely avoided,
 
the executive branch has gained extended power during war.
 
One reason why Congress has difficulty in reasserting
 
its influence on foreign affairs after wars is because it
 
has not reached a clear consensus regarding the nature of
 
the executive and how that relates to both military and
 
peacetime actions of the president.
 
In the Mexican War, Congress acquiesced to President
 
James Polk and officially declared the war after the
 
president had sent U.S. troops into disputed territory.
 
However, Congress also officially censured Polk's actions
 
after the war. Many scholars consider Polk's actions the
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cause of the Mexican War and note that "Polk was so intent
 
on acquiring California, which belonged to Mexico, that he
 
was prepared in early May 1846 to make war on Mexico with
 
or without a pretext."
 
When President Wpodrow Mlspn tried to gain support
 
for his 14 Points and the League of Nations, he met
 
opposition from both foreign leaders (i.e., Clemenceau in
 
France) and American statesmen. Chair of the Senate Foreign
 
Relations Committee, the conservative Henry Cabot Lodge was
 
known as Wilson's chief legislative obstacle. Lodge
 
announced his own "14 Points," a reservation for each of
 
Wilson's proposed policies. Lodge asked Wilson if he were
 
willing to put his soldiers and sailors at the disposition
 
of other nations. Most of Lodge's reservations were
 
intended to remind the executive "that Congress would
 
retain its constitutional role in foreign affairs."
 
Reflecting the public's anti-war sentiments and
 
congressional concern regarding their loss of power in
 
foreign affairs. Congressman Louis Ludlow introduced the
 
"Ludlow Amendment" in 1938 to require "a national
 
referendum on decisions for war," despite President
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's objections.
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Though he gnce believed that "American diplomacy would
 
be better served if Congress generally deferred to the
 
president," Senator William Fullbright later agreed with
 
Michael Glennon that "aCtivd involvement of all three
 
branches is required if this hation's foreign policy is to
 
be measured successfully against the requirements Of the
 
Constitution" and if "the balance intended for our
 
constitutional structure is to be restored." 7^
 
In addition to their concerns about a loss of power in
 
foreign affairs, Congress has expressed its concern over
 
the years that many presidents have abused the concept of
 
prerogative and committed unconstitutional actions in
 
defense of their private goals. As an example, many
 
presidents have issued doctrines intended to promote their
 
international agendas, whether Congress supported them or
 
not.
 
President Monroe issued his doctrine in 1823, though
 
it was not supported by congressional legislation or
 
affirmed in international law. For many years it remained
 
only a policy that asserted U.S. interests with an intent
 
to diminish foreign (non-U.S.) colonialization of the
 
Caribbean and Latin America. But eventually, the Monroe
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 Doctrine was used by several presidents for national and
 
personal aggrandizement. Polk used the doctrine in 1845
 
against British threats in California and Oregon, and to
 
justify the annexation of Texas, only one of the actions he
 
took that instigated the war with Mexicb in 1846.
 
Though President McKinley announced no specific
 
doctrine, his actions during the Spanish-Aitierican War and
 
his interference in the Philippine struggle for
 
independence were considered by some to be examples of "the
 
inherent ability of the executive to aggrandize his own
 
prerogatives." During the Filipino wars on independence,
 
McKinley — despite support for the rebels by the American
 
public — took actions to control that country and any in
 
the United States who spoke against his actions. He gave
 
American generals in the Philippines cart blanche to
 
suppress the insurrections. In the United States he tried
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to suppress free speech by censoring the press. As
 
Javits notes, "McKinley's actions — and those of his
 
immediate successors, dramatized the inherent ability of
 
the executive to aggrandize his own prerogatives within the
 
context of a perfectly legal exercise of constitutionally
 
assigned authority."
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Theodore Roosevelt developed his own oorollary to the
 
Monroe Doctrine, stating that the United States had "police
 
power" over Latin America. He used this proclamation to
 
acquire control over the Panama Canal during the 1903
 
revolution in that country. Despite the opposition of
 
Panama's nationalist leaders, the U.S. forced a treaty on
 
the country that named the United States as "guarantor of
 
Panamanian independence," and gave the U.S. the right to
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intervene in case of military disorder in the country.
 
Though the Republican-dominated 80"^ Congress
 
eventually supported the Truman Doctrine by providing the
 
financial means for it to be carried out, it was normally
 
hostile to the president. Thomas Patterson writes that
 
"many in Congress resented Truman having handed them a fait
 
accompli" when he announced the Triaman Doctrine on March
 
12, 1947. The doctrine was aimed at blocking Communist
 
expansion anywhere in the world, though especially in
 
Greece and Turkey. It became "the commanding guide to U.S.
 
foreign policy in the Cold War." 
 
Though no major wars officially have been declared
 
after World War II, Truman's foreign policy - articulated
 
by George Kennan (Director of the State Department Policy
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Planning Staff) — began the era of "containment" that
 
triggered numerous regional and international conflicts
 
through both sanctioned and covert actions in the 20*"^
 
century. Though undeclared wars, these conflicts had all
 
the catastrophic effects of officially declared wars: they
 
caused innumerable deaths, devastated cultures, and ruined
 
economies, yet seldom resulted in definitive solutions to
 
global hostilities. While it is not obvious what actually
 
caused the Cold War, it can be said that containment
 
contributed to the increase in presidential wars during
 
that era.
 
President Eisenhower broadened the Truman Doctrine by
 
issuing his own on January 5, 1957. Though both houses of
 
Congress approved it. Senator William Fullbright represented
 
a vocal minority when he protested that the administration
 
"asks for a blank grant of power . . . to be used in a blank
 
way, for a blank length of time, under blank conditions with
 
respect to blank nations in a blank area . , . Who fills in
 
the blanks?"
 
It should be noted that while Eisenhower did not
 
announce his doctrine until 1957, prior to that year, he had
 
sanctioned several covert actions across the globe without
 
congressional approval. These included the overthrow of
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popularly-elected foreign leaders such as Arbenz in
 
Guatemala (1954) and Mossadegh in Iran (1954).
 
The doctrines cited above and others illustrate the
 
growing power of the executiye to position the U.S. in
 
situations that have the high potential of instigating
 
armed conflicts. But except for refusing to support
 
Wilson's 14 Points and not ratifying the Veisailles Treaty
 
that ended World War I, Congress usually accepted the fait
 
accomplis of presidential decrees, thus participating as an
 
often silent partner in the erosion of their constitutional
 
powers.
 
The War Powers Act of 1973;
 
The War Powers Act of 1973 undertakes to establish a procedure for
 
comity as to different views in the future, so that Congress can be
 
brought in from the periphery of the warmaking power to its center in
 
order to exercise its proper role.
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Senator Edmund Muskie
 
In view of the presidential actions listed above - and
 
presidential actions during the Vietnam War and Watergate
 
investigation — it should be no surprise that a time came
 
when Congress took definitive steps to clarify the
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constitutional division of war powers and attempt to
 
exercise more control over foreign affairs, especially in
 
decisions to commit U.S. troops abroad.
 
In 1973 — over the veto of President Nixon — Congress
 
passed the War Powers Act, an attempt to reassert its role
 
in foreign affairs, especially in decisions to introduce
 
U.S. troops into military action. Introduced by Senator
 
Jacob Javits, the bill was passed along with the Budget and
 
Impoundment Control Act, which was designed to strengthen
 
Congress' power over foreign affairs through better fiscal
 
controls.
 
The War Powers Act was described by many as a feeble
 
attempt at best to diminish the number of undeclared wars
 
in which the U.S. could be involved. After it passed.
 
Congress required the president to "consult" with it
 
"whenever possible" prior to committing troops and to
 
submit an official, written report to Congress within 48
 
hours after troops were introduced into combat. In
 
addition. Congress could recommend withdrawal of troops
 
after 60 days if it did not concur with the purpose of
 
their deployment (see Appendix C).
 
But the 1973 War Powers Act never was the success it
 
was intended to be. Over the years, liberals,
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conservatives. Republicans and pemocrats have all attacked
 
the law, labeling it unconstitutional and impractical. Some
 
claim that the wording of the act is not definitive enough
 
to provide real guidance. While Congress may think that the
 
requirement to "consult" with them prior to committing
 
troops means to be "asked by the President for their advice
 
and opinions and, in appropriate circumstances, their
 
approval of action contemplated," presidents have said
 
that it was not clear with whom they were to consult (i.e.,
 
the entire Congress or a representative group) and have
 
defined "consult" in the narrowest of terms. They may have
 
consulted (met) with Congress, but have not always
 
concurred with — or acted on — their advice.
 
When President Clinton sent troops to Haiti in 1994,
 
he stated that while he would welcome the support of
 
Congress, he "did not agree that he was constitutionally
 
mandated to obtain it." According to Tom Raum, "All
 
presidents since Nixon have found ways to sidestep the
 
act."
 
In addition to the problems cited above, Congress does
 
not seem to have considered U.S, participation in
 
multinational organizations (e.g., the United Nations) and
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alliances (e.g., NATO, SEATO, etc.) when it drafted the War
 
Powers Act. U.S. involvement in such organizations and
 
treaties has generated so many military actions that it was
 
considered necessary in 1994 to enact the Foreign Relations
 
Authorization Act, which established new requirements for
 
the president to consult with Congress prior to committing
 
troops to "peacekeeping actions."
 
Congress has accused presidents of cloaking their own
 
administration's war goals by taking advantage of what they
 
describe as U.S. international obligations. They have done
 
so despite clauses such as Article 11 of the North Atlantic
 
Treaty which states that its provisions are to be carried
 
out by the parties "in accordance with their respective
 
constitutional processes Most interpret that clause to
 
imply some role for Congress — or the specific nation's
 
legislative branch — in the event of war. As Congressman
 
Vito Marcantonio noted, "When we agreed to the United
 
Nations Charter we never agreed to supplant our
 
Constitution with the UN Charter." Marcantonio asserts
 
that the deployment of troops in the name of organizations
 
such as the UN and NATO - which are not sovereign bodies ­
cannot supercede the regulations of its individual member
 
42
 
nations. It would require a constitutional amendment for
 
the United States to subvert its laws to those of
 
international bodies.
 
The effects of the War Powers Act are ambiguous.
 
Despite it, presidential wars have continued. Since 1973,
 
Congress has received only 50 reports under the Act (4 by
 
Ford, 1 by Carter, 14 by Reagan, 7 by Bush and 25 by
 
Clinton). The increasing number of reports should indicate
 
that simply having to submit a report to Congress — or even
 
seek their "consent" to deploy troops — has not controlled
 
presidential military actions. As a consequence, the War
 
Powers Act continues to receive widespread criticism and
 
attempts either to amend it or abolish it.
 
Yet despite its warranted criticisms, one might wonder
 
if the number of presidential wars would be even greater
 
without the War Powers Act. While the act has not
 
completely eliminated military action without the consent
 
of Congress, its existence has served over the years to be
 
a constant reminder to both Congress and to the executive
 
that acts of war should not be conducted unilaterally. And
 
though most presidents have sought to circumvent the act,
 
few presidents have been able to avoid its mandates
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Congressional Limitations:
 
One might ask why Congress has not used its "power of
 
the purse" to curtail unilateral presidential military
 
• ' B6-' ■ " 
actions by denying funding of such actions. Some
 
speculate that while Congress fights to retain the official
 
power to declare war, presidential military actions have
 
the benefit of shielding Congress from public criticism of
 
actions that it may have eventually sanctioned. Glennon
 
notes that "Congress, as partner, has approved an American
 
role that would be used to justify presidential rejection
 
of the partnership."
 
Some congressional critics note that Congress — while
 
complaining of military actions it did not approve in
 
advance — has not acted sufficiently on its power of the
 
purse. It continues to fund presidential wars, imposing :
 
only minor legislation to curtail them. Even Lincoln voted
 
financial support for the Mexican War, though he strongly
 
disagreed with actions taken by President Polk. It seems to
 
be the natural tendency for Congress to complain while
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continuing to fund presidential military actions.
 
Many speculate that members of today's Congress are
 
not adequate to the job of serving as a balance to
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executive prerogative. They accuse congressinen of focussing
 
too much on getting reelected and not taking action strong
 
enough to direct appropriately foreign and national policy.
 
Despite a general lack of interest in foreign affairs by
 
the American public — compounded by a low voting rate —
 
Congress makes feeble complaints regarding its declining
 
power, though it creates administrative work to perpetuate
 
itself while avoiding controversy. As George Will notes,
 
"Government is becoming less respected as it increases its
 
scope and becomes a 'servile state,'" gleefully buried in
 
bureaucratic responsibilities that shield it from
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addressing any issues that are considered controversial.
 
Thus, congressmen can avoid such issues in order to
 
increase their chances for reelection.
 
In order for Congress to become more affective,
 
drastic changes in the political culture of the United
 
States would have to occur. Such changes should reduce the
 
administrative role of Congress in a "servile state,"
 
reconsider the use of term limits as a way to improve
 
election to Congress, and reevaluate how the separation of
 
powers outlined in the Constitution can achieve real
 
balance, with meaningful congressional participation in
 
foreign affairs. Such participation could serve to check
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presidential prerogative, especially as it is used in
 
military actions.
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Chapter V:
 
The Iiimits o£ Presidential Prerogative
 
No overzealous President should involve the U.S. in unnecessary
 
hostilities while avoiding congressional scrutiny.
 
Ronald Rotunda
 
We have examined many conflicting ideas of
 
presidential prerogative and specific cases to understand
 
how that concept has been applied. Alexander Hamilton
 
believed in a strong presidency, even in time of peace. And
 
Madison — known for his support of the Republican view of a
 
limited executive defined by strict constitutional
 
allocation of powers — once conceded the need for
 
presidential prerogative.
 
Yet there must be some limits to prerogative, even for
 
those who support a strong executive and find the need for
 
presidential prerogative even greater in the war-torn 20*^^
 
century than when it was described by Locke. Are there
 
limits to prerogative? Were President McKihley's actions
 
against not only the Filipino insurgents, but those in the
 
Uiiited States who opposed him appropriate? When President
 
Truman sent troops to Korea without congressional approval,
 
was he within the limits of prerogative when he asserted
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"an inherent and seemingly unlimited [emphasis added]
 
presidential authority to protect any 'interest of American
 
foreign policy'"?" And when President Clinton bombed
 
KOSOVO and Serbia under presidential edict, was that within
 
presidential prerogative?
 
Justice Robert Jackson stated that "presidential
 
powers are not fixed, but fluctuate, depending upon their
 
disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress" 93 His
 
fellow justice. Chief Justice John Marshall "did not want
 
to define the limits of presidential power in the face of
 
complete congressional silence." Marshall went further to
 
state that the "president is invested with certain
 
important political powers and decisions of the executive
 
are conclusive and can never be examined by the courts."
 
Taking a more optimistic approach in reviewing
 
presidential actions, Alexander Bickel states that "there
 
are very few instances in our history where a president has
 
taken the law into his own hands against the will of
 
Cdngress." But Bickel's statement forces the question of
 
how he defines "the will of Congress" and if the president
 
should determine what Congress wants.
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As evidence of a need to limit presidential
 
prerogative, congressional scholars could list the
 
following presidential actions that Congress did not
 
support, or for which Congress was not consulted in
 
advance:
 
• Jefferson's supervision of the Louisiana Purchase
 
• Folk's actions that instigated the Mexican War
 
• Nixon's claim that "If the president does it, it is
 
not illegal"
 
• Reagan's funding of the Centra's despite the Boland
 
Amendment
 
In relation to the limits of presidential prerogative,
 
Harvey Mansfield's comment below further exemplifies the
 
ambivalence of executive power:
 
The beauty of executive power . . . is to be
 
both subordinate and not subordinate, both weak
 
and strong, and to reach where law cannot [using
 
prerogative], and thus supply the defect of law,
 
yet remain subordinate to law.
 
Throughout his writings, Mansfield notes the
 
ambivalence of the executive that "permits its strength to
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Be useful to republics, without endangering them." '' But
 
despite the contradictions of its power, the executive
 
continues to assert prerogative, leaving Congress and the
 
public able only to hope for the best. As Milkis and Nelson
 
note, "the design of the executive was one of the most
 
vexing problems of the Constitutional Convention," where
 
the framers "labored in the realm of intellectual and
 
political uncertainty." j
 
Mansfield has not been the only scholar to use the
 
word "ambivalent" in relation to executive power. It is
 
often employed in discussions related to the American
 
presidency. According to Richard Pious, "executive power
 
was a general term, sufficiently ambiguous so that no one
 
could say precisely what it meant." Though it was clear
 
that the Framers did not want a monarch, they demonstrated
 
their.own ambivalence regarding executive power as they
 
struggled to make that branch of government strong enough
 
to protect the Union from both foreign and domestic foes,
 
without making it so powerful that it could not work within
 
the confines of the Constitution and avoid the extremes of
 
the royal prerogative exercised by British monarchs.
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 The Effects of the Cold War and Post-Cold War Era;
 
The Colcl War era (approximately 1945 - 1990) Greated
 
an international context of perceived continual crisis
 
during which American presidents increased their use of
 
prerogative through an escalated use of military actions.
 
This was possible because the Cold War was considered an
 
actual war, whether hostilities manifested themselves in
 
military action or in ideological rhetoric. Concluding at
 
one time that "American diplomacy in general , . . would be
 
better served if Congress generally deferred to the
 
president," Glennon notes the following:
 
As the 1950s proceeded, and in a Congress
 
where parochialism still reigned, it was not
 
difficult to be persuaded that modern realities
 
required greater latitude for the president and
 
that proponents of congressional prerogative were
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agents of unenlightened reaction. 
During the Cold War, American presidents felt 
unrestrained in their use of military power. Though not a 
formally declared war, the Cold War contributed to 
expanding executive idea of prerogative. Presidents could 
explain that the development of the United States as a 
superpower thrust upon the executive branch a breadth of 
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 responsibility that necessitated corresponding authority •
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for quick, unilateral action. 
One major factor related to the growth of presidential 
military powers during the Cold War was the development of 
"weapons of mass destruction." With the authority to "push 
the button," presidents could consider the world to be 
continually at the brink of nuclear war, a state of mind 
they used to make deployment of U.S. troops into actual 
military actions seem more palatable, both to Congress and 
to the American public. 
Examples of presidential actions during the Cold War 
include Truman committing troops to the Korean War without 
prior congressional approval, Kennedy bringing the world to 
the brink of nuclear war during the Cuban missile crisis, 
and Lyndon Johnson coercing Congress into passing the 
Tonkin Gulf Resolution during the Vietnam War. 
While the majority of the military actions taken 
during the Cold War were supported either tacitly or 
overtly by Congress, the example of the Tonkin Gulf 
Resolution leads us to a discussion on presidential 
character and presidential prerogative achieved through 
deception. As with the supposed attack on the Maine during 
the Spanish-American War, confusion and misinformation have 
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 contributed to decisions to take military aGtion, Though it
 
has taken time to recognize that the explosion on the Maine
 
was due to a problem in the boiler room, the confusion
 
related to the need for the Tonkin Gulf Resolution was
 
evident in 1964, when it appeared to some that the U.S.
 
destroyer Maddox had been fired on by the North Vietnamese
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in the Gulf of Tonkin.
 
To complicate matters. President Johnson — and his
 
Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara — used the confusion
 
over the Maddox incident to "flagrantly mislead the
 
Congress. Glennon cites Johnson's "exaggerations"
 
(i.e., lies) to Congress when he notes how "in contract
 
law, a contract induced by fraud or mistake if voidable,"
 
and that "some analogous doctrine in constitutional law
 
should apply when statutory authority is given a president
 
on the basis of fraudulent or mistaken representation."
 
As evidenced by Nixon's many claims of executive privilege
 
during the Watergate investigations, there are enough valid
 
reasons to argue over presidential prerogative without
 
adding deception by the executive into the debate.
 
The effects of the Cold War on presidential
 
prerogative are indisputable. However, the end of the Cold
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 War has presented new challenges to presidential
 
prerogative. Though the United States is a major
 
participant in global economics, since it is the only
 
remaining superpower, some believe that the level of U.S.
 
participation in global politics should be more flexible
 
today. With no major rivals, the United States can
 
redefine its international role, possibly at the expense of
 
presidential prerogative. Ronald Steel agrees with the
 
above and lists the following steps that should be taken in
 
a post-Cold War era:
 
• The U.S. should not use the UN or NATO to accomplish
 
its own foreign policy goals under the guise of
 
"multilateralism" (e.g.. Bush's war against Iraq and
 
Clinton's intervention in Haiti).
 
• Realize that foreign policy almost by definition is
 
an elite preoccupation, but don't let the public
 
leave it automatically to the experts, who are often
 
self-appointed and want to promulgate bureaucracy.
 
• Increase public scrutiny of foreign policy making.
 
• Don't be tempted to try to police the entire world
 
or push the goal of "legal order" globally when it
 
may not be a natural state of affairs. In short,
 
adopt a much more minimalist approach to foreign
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policy.
 
Subject foreign policy to more rigorous checks of
 
reality and practicality by explaining why any
 
particular war/conflict is necessary.
 
Acknowledge that non-democratic governments
 
sometimes have legitimacy and should deserve respect
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of their sovereignty.
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chapter VI:
 
Concluding remarks
 
The United States has been fortunate in having strong
 
presidents in times of crisis. Furthermore, it is fortunate
 
that most presidents — Lincoln most notably — have acted
 
ultimately to protect the precepts of the Constitution,
 
though they have often done so by wielding power in a
 
manner that makes some question the limits of prerogative.
 
But if we examine the word "fortunate," we are
 
reminded that chance has, indeed, played a large role in
 
the effectiveness — and appropriateness ^  of presidential
 
prerogative. Fortunately, there have been relatively few
 
times when presidential actions have resulted in disasters
 
for U.S. foreign policy. And while the country could
 
continue to count on luck, perhaps an amended Constitution
 
could provide a clearer consensus regarding presidential
 
prerogative. This could better protect citizens and their
 
government during times when the country cannot depend
 
solely on luck, nor hope that presidential actions do not
 
damage the fabric of democracy, or cause disastrous policy
 
errors that result in a large-scale loss of life.
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 since p'olitics is truly the architectonic science, it
 
is the nature of humans to seek the power that can help
 
them attain theit goals,: he those basic {e.g., food,
 
shelter, clothing, etc.) or more ambitious (e.g., wealth,
 
happiness, influence, etc.). Because of this — and due to
 
the continual ambiguity of executive power — conflicts
 
between Congress and the executive seem inevitable and
 
endless. While some scholars believe that the Constitution
 
was designed to ensure slow debate — especially when
 
military actions were contemplated — others consider
 
continually conflicts between the legislative and executive
 
branches as often unnecessary and unproductive.
 
As indicated earlier, a definition of executive power
 
that is acceptable to both Congress and the executive has
 
not been found. And as we have noted, when Congress does
 
assert its constitutional powers, it often does so with
 
superficial arguments that do not address the roots of the
 
problem, which include the ambiguity of executive power,
 
the seemingly limitless nature of presidential prerogative,
 
and the successful attempts by Congress to evade public
 
scrutiny by avoiding controversial decisions.
 
Accordingly, Americans continue to enjoy their good
 
fortune, which has - along with a flawed, but exemplary
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Constitution and generally benevolent presidents —
 
contributed to a stable liberal democracy. Despite weak
 
congressional actions and the exercise of strong
 
presidential prerogative, the United States has outlasted
 
all other superpowers to become the preeminent global
 
leader, exemplifying the wisdom of its founders and the
 
strength of its leadership.
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A: The War Glauee of the U.S.
 
Excerpts from Article I. Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution:
 
The Congress shall have power To lay and collect
 
taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and
 
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
 
United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall
 
be uniform throughout the United States;
 
To declare war, grant letters of marque and
 
reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on
 
land and water;
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APPENDIX B: Powers vested in the
 
Executive by the Constitution
 
Excerpts from Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution
 
The President shall be commander in chief of the Army
 
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
 
several states, when called into the actual service of the
 
United States; he may require the opinion, in writing, of
 
the principal officer in each of the executive departments,
 
upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective
 
offices, and he shall have power to grant reprieves and
 
pardons for offenses against the United States, except in
 
cases of impeachment.
 
He shall have power, by and with the advice and
 
consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-

thirds of the Senators present concur;
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 APPENDIX C: Selections from
 
the War Powers Resolution of 1973
 
If U.S. troops are sent into action, the President must do the
 
following:
 
• Be responding to a national emergencY created by an
 
attack on U.S. territory or on U.S. armed forces
 
• Report to Congress immediately and terminate any use of
 
troops within 60 days unless Congress specifically approves
 
of further action (Section 4a-l)
 
• consult with Congress in every possible instance prior to
 
the introduction of troops (Section 3). NOTE: The
 
definition of "consult" has,created different
 
interpretations of this point. Rresidents have often
 
considered "consult to mean only to inform, while some
 
members of Congress believe it means that the President
 
must seek their advice prior to sending troops, and is some
 
cases even obtain their approval.
 
• Consult with Congress regularly after the introduction of
 
combat troops
 
• Submit a detailed written report to the Speaker of the
 
House of Representatives and the President Pro Tempore of
 
the Senate within 48 hours after the introduction of coinbat
 
troops
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